FTR

Summary Courts- Martial Relook

/ James Phillips / 2 Comments

If you want self help military legal to guide you through a summary courts-martial, go to invisblelawyer.com.

I (www.jamesphillipslaw.com) recently represented a client at Fort Campbell in a Summary Court Martial and upon reflection have decided to follow up on an earlier post about Summary Courts-Martial (https://jaglaw.wordpress.com/2009/02/22/summary-court-martial-a-fair-process/).  The reason for this is that there was a suggestion in my prior post that Summary Courts-Martial are somehow inherently unfair.  That was not what I intended to convey.  I was attempting to portray the feel of a summary courts-martial to the servicemember and also the inherent problem with using summary court officers who are wholly unaware of the legal aspects of the UCMJ and the Rules in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).

Last week, I represented a soldier at Fort Campbell on several drug charges.  In that case there were issues that had to be heard through a Motion to Suppress.  The case in some ways hinged on whether or not Article 31 rights had been given to the soldier and whether or not his statement and all derivative evidence should be suppressed (fruit of the poison tree doctrine).  The Summary Court Officer began the proceeding with an eye towards conviction, but as the Summary Court proceeded he became very thought and began to examine the legality and competency of the evidence.  In his verdict, he took into account the Article 31 rights issue and weighted it against the competent evidence that had been presented.  Some of this thoughtful analysis was brought about by the long discussions and period of education that took place between myself, as the only attorney in the room, the Summary Court Officer and the paralegal assigned to record the record of trial.  In the end, using his own initiative, the Summary Court Officer was able to properly navigate the proceeding and come up with both findings and sentence that were legally justified and consistent with a judgement that would have been found in a higher level Courts-Martial in front of a judge or panel.

Much of this was obviously driven by the personality and training of the Summary Court Officer.  In essence, he was a GOOD one.  That ultimately is the problem with Summary Court Martials.   Judges have been trained to provide consistency in the Court Martial.  They know the rules of evidence.  Hopefully, they are up on their case law.  Most of the military and civilian attorneys that practice before a Judge have an idea of how he rules.  All of these things provide defense attorneys and their clients a basis for good advice and sound decision-making.  This is much harder when you are operating in the realm of the Summary Courts-Martial.

In my Motion to Suppress at the Summary Court Martial last week, although the Motion was a valid legal argument, I did not know how the Summary Court Officer would view the Motion.  Was this defense trickery?  Was this a non-issue because he didn’t care?  Was he already convinced the accused was guilty?  It was hard for me to advise the client on whether or not he should object to the SCM because I didn’t know whether or not there would be an honest and fair assessment of our case by the SCM Officer.  We were lucky that this SCM Officer was very thoughtful and serious about the process.

Some of the arbitrariness of the Summary Court Process could be taken away by giving the SCM Officer more training in this area.  Maybe picking them for a term of duty or sending them through a class on legal justice.  Either way, if some of the arbitrariness is taken away, an SCM can be the best way for a servicemember to go.

Apache Attack near Karbala

/ James Phillips / 3 Comments

I (www.jamesphillipslaw.com) was on the Assault Command Post (ACP) with the 101st Airborne Division during the ground offensive during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For a JAG Officer, I couldn’t imagine a better position.  I was a relatively junior officer, a first term captain, and I had landed a gig where I was doing what almost every JAG Officer dreams about.  I was with the 101st, calling the legality of fires in combat and working in the Command Post with MG Petraeus.

The 101st, commanded by MG Petraeus at the time, had two command posts.  The more mobile post was the ACP which moved quickly from one position to another.  The ACP was designed to be a tactical command post that was minimally staffed, but able to command the 101st for a day or two, while the Main CP set up.  The less mobile main command post followed closely behind, but was harder to set up and took a longer time to position. So, MG Petraeus was with us for most of the actual fighting.

The ACP had one staff member for each section of the command.  S-1, S-2, fire team, etc…, were all represent by a relatively junior officer in the ACP. The artillery officer that briefed the fire missions in the ACP was appropriately name Maj. Gunn.  He was a barrel chested Hispanic man, who took some time to warm up to me initially.  Typical of any artillery officer, he couldn’t understand how a JAG a place in a combat command post.  I had to agree with him and eventually, he and I became friends. Over time, I became “Harm” named after the character on the TV show JAG.

After the first ten days of the war, we had convoyed up into Southern Iraq.  The 101st was following closely behind 3rd ID and we had set up our ACP  somewhere outside of the city of Karbala. 

Now, before we left Kuwait, my mom had sent me a care package and in that package was chocolate gold.  I had approximately two hundred chocolate covered coffee beans.  Since we were not allowed the normal stimulants, I was forced to use the magic beans to keep me awake, and that they did.  I kept them safely hidden away during our assault on Iraq, because I knew that at some point I would have to stay awake for a very long period of time.

I started a 48 hour shift in the ACP the day before the 101st was going to do a helicopter assault on Karbala.  The day before, an attack helicopter assault had taken place, and during the assault of their 32 helicopters, 29 had come back filled with holes.  I believe two of the helicopters were actually shot down and the others were inoperable after the attack.

The Apaches had been all hit by small arms ground fire.  The issue was that during the First Gulf  War, Saddam Hussein had learned a little trick.  When our helicopters were passing over, if everyone on the ground fired their weapons into the air, they could fill the sky with lead.  Shear volume of bullets was bound to cause damage to many of our Apaches.  This is what had happened to the first air assault.

The problem was that the reading of our Rules of Engagement (ROE) passed down from the all knowing CENTCOM command seemed to suggest that the only way we could fire on civilians or areas with civilian on the ground was in self-defense.  Now, I did not then or now believe that that was the only analysis that could be used.  The helicopter pilots during their tactical briefing prior to flying into Karbala believed that they could not fire their HELLFIRE missiles because it was a disproportionate response to the small arms fire from the ground.  I did not agree with this interpretation of the ROE.

When we planned our air assault mission, I was asked by MAJ Gunn what was the legality of a SEAD fire mission.  The purpose of a seed fire mission is to create a firing corridor for the Apache helicopters.  The essential idea is that artillery and air strikes are laid down just a couple of minutes prior to the air attack.  The blast from the artillery and the air strikes keeps all enemy combatants in their holes and heads down so the helicopters can pass overhead.  MAJ Gunn was unsure of the legality of a SEAD fire mission but he felt it was essential to the ultimate success of the mission.

I agreed that it was both necessary and legal.  Part of this analysis was helped by the fact that by the time I had to make the call, I had been eating chocolate covered coffees beans, one after another for over two hours.  I was wired. But for me, the basic idea was that for a helicopter, laying down SEAD fire was a measure of self defense.  If a helicopter, which is a fairly vulnerable weapon platform is moving to contact with the enemy, there is a necessity to getting it safely to position.  If it is known that the enemy will fire prior to them getting into position, there is an argument that a SEAD mission is a mission of self-defense.  There is also another argument and that is that SEAD missions are not designed to kill enemy combatants or civilians, although this may be collateral damage and had to be balanced with the need for the mission, the SEAD fire itself is only designed, at least for this particular mission, to keep the enemy combatants from being able to fire upward.  In the ROE, this was neither self-defense nor an anticipatory attack and had fallen into a loophole in the ROE analysis.  Now, this may have been fixed later, but at that time, the JAG lawyers had not resolved the problem.

As the mission started, I watched as each helicopter was in position and flew toward Karbala.  The SEAD mission blasted holes in the corridor and the helicopter pilots reported back that they were not receiving any ground fire.  All of our helicopters came back that night.  We lost no pilots, no aircraft and there were only a few bullet holes to fix.  As a JAG, I knew that the call I made was correct and essential.

I just didn’t sleep for the next week.

SSG Warner heads home

/ James Phillips / 2 Comments

I (www.jamesphillipslaw.com) spoke to SSG Mitch Warner’s family on Monday morning.  They solidly stand behind Mitch and are now beginning to gather the evidence required for us to put on an appeal for SSG Warner.  In speaking to them, they spoke of their disappointment with the US Army and the decision-making that lead to the death of detainee Ali Mansur by LT Behenna.

SSG Warner is now headed to Fort Sill, OK, where he will serve the balance of his seventeen month sentence.  He will be close to home and at least he will finally be finished with his combat tours.

One of the questions taht I have never gotten an answer for in this case is Why did LT Behenna’s higher headquarters and unit release Ali Mansur to 5th platoon?  This seemed extremely odd to me.  5th platoon had lost soldiers and had several wounded just a couple weeks prior.  Ali Mansur was a suspect in those killings and that IED attack.  5th platoon had gone out and picked Ali Mansur and took him into the detainee detention facility as a suspect in the death of the soldiers.

So, why in the world, when the higher ups had decided that Ali Mansur had no information and couldn’t be held for the attack, did the chain of command use the same platoon that picked him up as a suspected terrorist to drop him off to the local population?  There are no good answers.  One answer would be that the Chain of Command wanted LT Behenna to have someone kill Ali Mansur.  If there was a deliberate and conscious knowledge of Ali Mansur’s alleged AQI association, the COC may have thought that LT Behenna would find a way to have Ali Mansur killed.  They could have dropped him off with those Iraqis that wanted him dead.  They could have faked an incident or escape.  The expectation may have been that 5th platoon would find a way to get the job done.

But, I am not much of a conspiracy theorist.  The more likely answer is that this was just stupid negligence.  The Chain of Command should have known that there would be an issue with the drop off of this detainee, but they were just too busy or distracted to think of the clear implications of this drop off.

Either way, this was an event that should have been avoided.  The command had a responsibility to know that soldiers that have been under attack and have suspected terrorist in detention for those attacks are not the soldiers that should drop that detainee off to the local populace.  This is a no brainer.

SSG Warner and LT Behenna are now both serving time for a death of a detainee.  The trials of both men were complicated by the fact that they each knew that Ali Mansur was a suspected AQI member.  LT Behenna did have justification for the killing, but it probably wasn’t the justification that the US Army wants to hear.  Regardless, this whole event should have been stopped before it ever got started.  Another platoon should have done the drop off.  The blame for the shots being fired can be laid at LT Behenna’s feet, but the death of Ali Mansur and the conviction of two US Infantrymen can be laid at the feet of the chain of command. 

Update on LT Behenna Trial

/ James Phillips / 1 Comment

I (www.jamesphillipslaw.com) was at Fort Campbell today and watched a portion of US v. Behenna.  The prosecution is three quarters of the way through their case.  The case so far has consisted of laying the foundations for proving the murder. The case seems strong, but the defense has yet to present their evidence and that will probably not begin until early Thursday morning. 

The panel members (or the civilian equivalent to a military jury) were fully engaged and very attentive today.   1LT Behenna’s panel consists of seven officers on the panel.  One woman and six  men have been selected for Behenna’s panel.  Four members of the panel are captains.  The other three are field grade officers.  A majority of the panel appears to have combat experience.

The prosecution will present the meat of their case tomorrow.  “Harry” the interpretor, who was with 1LT Behenna at the time of Ali Mansur’s death, is expected to testify.  He is expected to testify to witnessing Ali Mansur getting shot.  Strange as it may seem, if “Harry” follows his pattern from the Article 32 hearing, he will testify as the interpretor through an interpretor.  After “Harry” is done testifying, SSG Mitch Warner is expected to be the final witness in the prosecutions case.  He will also testify as an eye witness to the events that took place in the desert.

Jack Zimmerman, the civilian defense counsel for 1LT Behenna, vigorously fought any characterization of Ali Mansur’s death with the words “homicide” and “crime” today.  His defense team lodged several objections to the prosecutions characterizations of the death with any words that resembled a crime.  The argument may have seemed to be one of semantics to the panel, but the defense clearly was sending a message with the objections that they were objecting to the prosecutions entire case.  They are trying to focus the panel on the idea that this may have been a lawful killing.  They also do not want to have the panel  prejudge Behenna prior to them being able to put on their defense.

The defense will begin presenting evidence probably this Thursday.  They will probably follow up with their promises made during opening arguments, which will mean that they will put evidence on that will demonstrate that 1LT Behenna was not thinking clearly at the time of the killing.  They will also probably put on evidence showing that Ali Mansur may have been a suspected terrorist.

CPT Johnston, 1LT Behenna’s acting commander during the investigation, testified today regarding his preliminary investigation into the death of Ali Mansur. After his testimony, the panel presented the military judge with several written questions.  The questions presented by the panel were very thoughtful and seemed defense oriented.

The prosecution brought several witnesses to testify from Iraq.  The Iraqis testified through an interpretor. 

There were several journalists in the audience, but overall, the case has not drawn the media attention it probably deserves.

AWOL- A Crime? Or a Soldier Quitting a Job?

/ James Phillips / 10 Comments

Absent Without Leave (AWOL).  www.ucmjlawyer.com and www.jamesphillipslaw.com.

We offer self-help legal for AWOL at invisblelawyer.com.  AWOL is a crime under Article 86 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  The crime itself is problematic because the question has to be asked, “is it really a crime?”  Oh, I know, you hard core military folk are going to disown me for this one.  I mean, here I am, a two time war vet, bronze star recipient, saying that AWOL may not be a  crime.

Now, for all my soldiers that are reading this because you are AWOL and looking for advice, you may just want to scroll to the end of the blog now so that you can get helpful tips for getting out of your predicament.

For all others, follow along, when soldiers go AWOL, they are usually  highly disenchanted with their unit.  Many times they have drug problems or family problems that are causing them to think irrationally.

I have found that there are generally two types of soldiers that go AWOL.  (1) The soldier who has been in for several years, is a junior NCO and has been to Iraq.  Many of these guys have just had it with their chain of command and due to PTSD issues or emotional problems just decide to disappear. (2)  The other type of soldier is the relatively new soldier, virtually a trainee, who doesn’t know how to put in for a voluntary administrative discharge, so he just leaves.

Most soldiers who go AWOL are using it as a means to get a discharge.   A civilian job allows the employees to quit.  I mean, it is reasonable for people to tell their boss to “take this job and shove it.”  The military doesn’t allow you to do that, but really, why should the military be different than civilian employment?  The argument of course is that civilians don’t go to war.

But, this difference creates a problem.  Do we really want people, in an all-volunteer military, to be forced to come to work everyday?

As a legal assistance officer at Fort Campbell, I remember when Fort Campbell had a policy that any homosexual soldier would be out of the Army within 72 hours.  This policy was a result of the Winchell incident, when a soldier was beaten to death for being a known homosexual.  But, many soldiers, who didn’t want to be in the Army, would claim that they were gay in order to get out of the Army.  At Fort Campbell, this was a quick and painless ticket home.  They would get an honorable discharge and an annotation on their DD 214 stating they were discharge for Homosexual Conduct. What was a  little stigma between friends?  The reality was that the soldiers that really wanted to get out of the Army would do and say anything to get out.

For me, I think there ought to be some way that soldiers can get administratively discharged based upon several voluntary reasons.  Soldiers that don’t want to be in the Military should not be there.  A soldier with a bad attitude can drive the whole unit into the ground.

Col. Joseph Anderson, now General Anderson, was the Brigade Commander for 2BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).  Once we got back from Iraq, he had a policy of quickly removing soldiers that were guilty of doing drugs from his units.  He was less interested in court martialling them than he was getting them out of the unit.  The longer a soldier with a drug problem was in the unit, the more disgruntled he would become.  Eventually, the soldier’s bad attitude, use of drugs and insubordination would eventually become like a cancer and spread to other members of the unit.  Getting them out was a means of keeping the unit disciplined and clean.

AWOL has the same effect on a unit.  A soldier who has been AWOL for any period of time becomes “civilianized.”  He has normally decided that he no longer wants to be in the military and he is a cancer within the unit.  He is generally insubordinate.  Many times he no longer has military clothing.  He doesn’t have money. He lives in the barracks and has limited access to the military post’s amenities.  He will hang out with other soldiers that are disgruntled and they will begin to ferment within the unit.

Generally, the AWOL soldier can also be rehabilitated within society as a whole.  Many times they are smart young guys that need more time to mature.  As they become older and more mature, they will regret their bad choices and begin to try to fix their transgressions from their younger days.  I see this when these guys come back years later, grown up and matured, wanting to fix their military records.  They have to go through the slow agonizing process of submitting an application to a Military Discharge Review Board.

Now, for you AWOL guys.  Here is the best advice I can give you.  TURN YOURSELF BACK IN.  Get back within military control and get this thing over with.

The longer you were gone, the more likely you will need an attorney.  But, each military unit has some discretion on how they deal with each and every AWOL.  This means that some units will discharge the soldier with little to no hassle.  Others will be quite severe.

Once you turn yourself into the unit, do not give a statement.  You have Article 31, which means you have the right to remain silent and you have the right to an attorney.  You should not make any statements to the chain of command because even though it seems pretty simple, if they take you to a Court Martial, they still have to prove the charge and usually it is easier to prove a charge when a guy has admitted it than not.

Also, you will be entitled to a Trial Defense Attorney.  You should take advantage of this.  AWOL punishments vary from post to post, so your local Trial Defense Services attorney will be able to give you the lay of the land and help you decide what your best course of action will be.  Many times the TDS attorney can get you administratively discharged rather than have to go through the pain of a Court Martial.