Right after Bush announced “Mission Accomplished,” in 2003, I was serving with the 101st as a JAG in Iraq. After securing Baghdad, Gen. Petraeus convoyed the division North to Mosul. By July, I was heading up what we had facetiously dubbed the Mosul Office of Judicial Operations (the MOJO). Our mission was to reestablish a judiciary in Northern Iraq. www.jamesphillipslaw.com
My day to day operation consisted of going down to the Mosul courthouse to supervise the Iraqi judges (all BAATHISTs). Funny enough, the statutory codes that the Iraqis had on the books were quite democratic. They were based on the British System. But, although the system looked good on paper, the actual workings of the judicial system was corrupt and about what a person would expect of Saddam’s regime. Generally, a detainee or criminal would never get to the courthouse. Once detained, the police would sweat the family for money by holding the prisoner at the local police station. If the family couldn’t pay, eventually, he would make it to the courthouse. There he would have an opportunity to tell his story to the judge or a panel of judges.
My job was to jump start the system and end decades of corruption. Obviously this Quixotic quest was fraught with both peril and a cerain sense of futility.
The head judge was a big bellied arrogant man who had been a powerful member of the local Baath party. Our presence scared him, but he didn’t want to lose his esteemed position so he did what we told him.
In the late summer of 2003, after a lot of dangerous and hard work, my MOJO team had gotten the police to stop holding the prisoners in the jails and actually start sending the prisoners to the courthouse. Of course, this created several logistical problems, too many prisoners at the court house, but we felt good at helping to move the wheels of justice forward.
Then, we got a message from the State Department and the Department of Justice back home. In their infinite wisdom, they had determined that it was time to give the Iraqis several Americanized rights. One of those rights was the right to remain silent. The other right was the right to a lawyer. Now, these lawyers from the State Department and the DOJ, weren’t in Iraq, and hadn’t a clue as to the effects this would produce. They also probably didn’t realize that under the Saddam Regime, the Iraqis had a their own British System of justice. A system of justice that does not rely on Miranda, the watershed case granting Americans the right to remain silent and the right to a lawyer.
The day after we were given the order to institute the new changes to the Iraqi law, in the form of a Coalition Order, we went down to the Mosul Courthouse and explained the need for Miranda to the Head Judge. He seemed perplexed but called all the lawyers together, about fifty of them in Ninevah province and explained what we would be doing. They did not agree with the changes, nor understand the need for them.
What happened next was mind boggling. Within days, the entire judicial system in Northern Iraq shut down. The Courthouse became an engine of inefficiency. Criminals were angry. Lawyers were frustrated. Average citizens were confused.
The criminals hated the idea of remaining silent. They wanted to tell their side of the story. There is a tradition in Iraq that you get to lie about the crime you committed. Criminals in Iraq believe they have the right to tell the judge how they have been wrongfully detained and that weren’t at the scene. They have thousands of stories ready for the judge and happily change each and every version as they go along. The idea that they would not be able to lie to the judge was repulsive to them.
Second, waiting for the appointment of a lawyer, was not a satisfactory answer. The criminals hated lawyers, even defense lawyers. They didn’t trust the lawyers and felt as though this was a way to railroad them into prison.
Essentially, Miranda had taken away their right to defend themselves.
Also, since there wasn’t enough lawyers because there had never been a right to a lawyer before and the DOJ and State Department had not funded court-appointed lawyers. No one had the money or inclination to hire a lawyer. The Courts didn’t have the money to pay for the lawyers. So, without a mandated lawyer, the system shut down.
The ideals were good, but it was a fiasco in practice. The Iraqis were not appreciative nor ready for the American ideals. Sadly, they are probably still not ready for those same ideals.